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I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 2008, the Inupiat Eskimo community of Kivalina, 
Alaska, filed suit against ExxonMobil Corporation and various other 
energy-producing concerns for their purported contribution to 
global warming.  The Inupiat allege that global warming is destroying 
their ancestral habitat on the northern Alaskan coast, seventy miles 
north of the Arctic Circle.1  The Kivalina complaint characterizes the 
defendants as “many of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in 
the United States”2 and seeks damages under federal and state com-
mon law, largely under theories of public and private nuisance.3  Kiv-
alina represents the second wave of climate change litigation, the first 
wave having been stalled by federal court decisions dismissing those 
cases on justiciability grounds.4  Notwithstanding those first wave de-
cisions (all of which are on appeal), the Kivalina case makes it clear 
that climate change litigation, like climate change itself, is not going 
away, and that those businesses that might be targeted in such litiga-
tion should be aware of the possibilities of, and potential roadblocks 
to, insurance coverage for these suits.  This Article addresses a spe-
cific aspect of that broader theme: whether carbon dioxide should be 
 ∗ J. Wylie Donald is a Partner at McCarter & English, LLP in Wilmington, Dela-
ware; he received his B.A. in mathematics.  Craig W. Davis is an Associate at McCarter 
& English in Newark, New Jersey; he received his B.A. in geological sciences.  The 
opinions contained in this Article are those of the authors and not necessarily of 
McCarter & English or its clients.  The authors wish to thank Gregory Little for his 
research assistance and the staff of the Seton Hall Law Review for their fastidious edi-
torial efforts and professional courtesy. 
 1 See Complaint at 1, Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. CV-08-1138 
(C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 2 Id. at 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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considered a “pollutant” under a commercial general liability (CGL) 
policy for purposes of applying the policy’s “absolute pollution exclu-
sion.”5  A consideration of the science underlying climate change 
and, particularly, the dynamics of the terrestrial carbon cycle, side-by-
side with an analysis of the typical absolute pollution exclusion, leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that carbon dioxide cannot reasonably 
be considered a “pollutant” as defined in a typical CGL policy.  
Therefore, the costs and liabilities associated with climate change liti-
gation should not be barred by the exclusion. 
The Supreme Court of the United States perhaps set the stage in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.6  In that case, the Court ordered the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to reconsider its deci-
sion not to regulate anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions, which 
many scientists agree are contributing to a global rise in tempera-
ture.7  Also, as exemplified in the Kivalina case, global temperature 
increase is tied to a number of adverse environmental consequences, 
including a rise in sea level and resulting destruction of coastal prop-
erty8 and, according to some, an increase in storm activity and conse-
quent coastal erosion.9  By elbowing its way into the global warming 
debate, the Court raised many more questions than it answered.  In 
addition to its broad reading of Article III standing jurisprudence 
and its potential impact on future environmental regulation and ba-
sic principles of administrative law, one of the myriad questions 
prompted by the Court’s decision (and by cases such as Kivalina) is 
whether an absolute pollution exclusion in a liability insurance policy 
should act to exclude coverage for damages—such as submersion of 
property due to sea-level changes or property damage caused by 
coastal erosion from increased storm activity—claimed to result from 
a party’s release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, or, in short, 
whether carbon dioxide qualifies as a “pollutant” under the exclu-
sion.  This issue has been brought specifically to bear in cases like 
Kivalina, in which plaintiffs seek damages from alleged producers of 
 5 For another facet of the issue of insurance coverage for climate change-related 
litigation and liability, see J. Wylie Donald & Loly Garcia Tor, Climate Change and the 
D&O Pollution Exclusion, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1033 (2006). 
 6 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 7 Id. at 1446. The Court specifically addressed only the regulation of carbon di-
oxide emissions from motor vehicles.  See id. passim.  The decision nonetheless raised 
many questions about anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions in general. 
 8 See id. at 1452. 
 9 See Complaint, supra note 1. 
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atmospheric carbon dioxide specifically for the kinds of injuries pur-
ported to result from climate change in the form of global warming.10
The typical absolute pollution exclusion requires that the dam-
ages for which a policyholder seeks coverage “arise out of” the release 
of a “pollutant,” which is defined in relevant part as a “gaseous . . . ir-
ritant or contaminant.”11  Under a close reading of that language, 
atmospheric carbon dioxide comes up shy of qualifying as a “pollut-
ant” so as to fall within the exclusion’s bar to coverage.  Carbon diox-
ide is ubiquitous, and it plays a varied and essential role in nature 
(and in technology).  It is an essential element of both inorganic 
earth processes and of the organic cycles of the biosphere.  Further, 
the sources of atmospheric carbon dioxide are vast and are part of an 
enormously complex chemical system with many unknown or poorly 
understood variables.  Even in its present-day atmospheric concentra-
tions, carbon dioxide can be considered neither an “irritant” nor a 
“contaminant,” but is simply an integral part of the biogeochemical 
carbon cycle. 
Part II of this Article addresses the science of carbon dioxide in 
the environment by examining its sources and the processes by which 
it is formed, transferred, transformed, and destroyed.  Part III dis-
cusses carbon dioxide and its relationship to coverage under a liabil-
ity insurance policy.  Specifically, Part III addresses the applicability 
of absolute pollution exclusions to claims for damages based on the 
environmental effects of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions 
and, concomitantly, whether carbon dioxide is excluded by the op-
eration of an absolute pollution exclusion.  Part III focuses particu-
larly on whether carbon dioxide can be considered an “irritant” or 
“contaminant” as those terms are used in the exclusion. 
II. CARBON DIOXIDE AND THE CARBON CYCLE 
Atmospheric carbon dioxide is essential to life on Earth.12  Apart 
from water, one would be hard pressed to think of a more ubiquitous, 
benign, and useful substance than carbon dioxide.  Carbon dioxide is 
a by-product of a wide variety of natural and human-induced proc-
esses, including fermentation, animal respiration, decomposition of 
organic matter, volcanism, plate tectonics, and the combustion of 
 10 Id. at 45–46. 
 11 See R. Stephen Burke, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: The Agony, the Ecstasy, and the 
Irony for Insurance Companies, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 443, 466 (1990). 
 12 F. STUART CHAPIN III ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEM ECOLOGY 21 
(2002). 
8038870_1.DOC 1/12/2009  1:33 PM 
110 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:107 
 
carbon-containing materials, such as fossil fuels.13  In its natural state, 
carbon dioxide is a non-reactive, slightly water-soluble gas.14  At at-
mospheric levels, it is non-toxic, though in high concentrations it can 
cause suffocation simply by displacing oxygen available for respira-
tion.15  If subjected to high pressure and then allowed to return to 
normal atmospheric pressure levels, carbon dioxide forms a sublimat-
ing solid that is familiar to concert and theatergoers as dry ice.16  It is 
used in fire extinguishers, inflatable life rafts, and carbonated bever-
ages.17  It is also used as a fume suppressant in certain metallurgical 
processes, i.e., as an agent for reducing atmospheric pollutants.18  Al-
though comprising only about 0.037 percent of the earth’s atmos-
phere,19 that amount nonetheless constitutes an enormous global 
pool of carbon dioxide, accounting for more than 750 billion metric 
tons of atmospheric carbon.20  By comparison, studies estimate that in 
2004 human industrial activity contributed almost eight billion metric 
tons of carbon (as carbon dioxide) into the atmosphere through the 
burning of fossil fuels and, to a lesser extent, cement production.21
 13 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE 
AND STORAGE 385 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2005); see generally Kim Holmén, The Global 
Carbon Cycle, in GLOBAL BIOGEOCHEMICAL CYCLES 239 (Samuel S. Butcher et al. eds., 
1992). 
 14 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 13, at 385–90. 
 15 See id. at 391.  In 1986, 1746 people died from asphyxiation when a volcanic 
crater lake in Cameroon released a burst of carbon dioxide gas.  Michael R. 
Rampino, Volcanic Hazards, in UNDERSTANDING THE EARTH 506, 513 (Geoff Brown et 
al. eds., 1992).  It is interesting to contrast non-toxic carbon dioxide with oxygen, 
which is poisonous to some organisms and in great enough concentrations is toxic to 
humans.  See A.F. HOLLEMAN & EGON WIBERG, INORGANIC CHEMISTRY 472 (Nils Wiberg 
ed., Mary Eagleson & William Brewer trans., 34th ed. 2001) (1900). 
 16 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 13. 
 17 See id. at 393. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 390; CHAPIN et al., supra note 12. 
 20 See Kennth L. Denman et al., Couplings Between Changes in the Climate System and 
Biogeochemistry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 499, 515 fig.7.3 
(Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007); D. Schimel et al., Radiative Forcing of Climate 
Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 1995:  THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE  65, 77 fig.2.1 
(J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1996).  Climate scientists typically measure carbon dioxide 
amounts in terms of gigatons of carbon (in the form of carbon dioxide).  See, e.g., id. 
at 77–78 & fig.2.1.  This is a meaningful measurement because other atmospheric 
carbon compounds, such as carbon monoxide (CO) and methane (CH4), are quanti-
tatively negligible in comparison with carbon dioxide.  Id. at 78.  See also 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 118 tbl.1 (James R. Pfaf-
flin & Edward N. Ziegler eds., 5th ed. 2006) (listing relative quantities of chemical 
components of atmosphere in parts per million).  A gigaton equals one billion met-
ric tons.  See Denman et al., supra, at 512. 
 21 G. Marland et al., Global, Regional, and National CO2 Emissions, in CARBON 
DIOXIDE INFORMATION ANALYSIS CENTER, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, TRENDS: A 
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As suggested above, the sources of atmospheric carbon diox-
ide—anthropogenic and naturally occurring—are many.  The pri-
mary sources of anthropogenic carbon dioxide in the atmosphere are 
the burning of fossil fuels and the destruction of forests.22  The for-
mer is a direct source of atmospheric carbon dioxide, increasing 
from about 5.4 billion metric tons per year through the 1980s to 7.2 
billion tons per year between 2000 and 2005.23  It is estimated that be-
tween 1750 and 2005, human industrial activity released 315 billion 
tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, with more than half of 
that amount accumulating since the mid-1970s.24  The destruction of 
forests has also resulted in an increase of atmospheric carbon diox-
ide—estimates of the increase generally range between 1.6 and 2.2 
billion tons per year during the 1980s and 1990s—not directly, but 
because of the diminution or partial elimination of a carbon dioxide 
“sink”; i.e., the plants destroyed in deforestation had functioned to 
remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.25  This anthropogenic 
one-two punch is only one small part of a vast and complex chemical 
system known as the carbon cycle.26
The carbon cycle is a closed chemical system in which carbon 
circulates through nature largely, though not exclusively, in the form 
of carbon dioxide.27  The primordial source of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide is related to the evolution of the primitive earth atmosphere 
COMPENDIUM OF DATA ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (2008).  By far, burning fossil fu-
els accounts for most of this amount (about ninety-five percent), with cement pro-
duction contributing to a much lesser extent (about four percent).  Id.  These figures 
have increased in the last few decades.  In 1990, the same human industrial activity 
contributed about six billion metric tons of carbon into the atmosphere.  Schimel et 
al., supra note 20, at 78.  These numbers do not represent the net increase of atmos-
pheric carbon dioxide, which is a smaller amount (averaging about 4.1 billion tons of 
carbon dioxide per year between 2000 and 2005, up from about 3.3 billion tons in 
the 1980s and 1990s) due to uptake of carbon dioxide by other regions of the carbon 
cycle, such as the oceans.  See Denman et al., supra note 20, at 501, 516 tbl.7.1; 
Schimel et al., supra note 20, at 78. 
 22 Denman et al., supra note 20, at 511; Eric T. Sundquist, The Global Carbon Diox-
ide Budget, 259 SCI. 934, 934, 937–38 (1993). 
 23 Denman et al., supra note 20, at 501, 516–17 & tbl.7.1; Schimel et al., supra 
note 20, at 78.  As discussed supra, note 21, these figures include the relatively minor 
contribution of cement production. 
 24 Marland et al., supra note 21. 
 25 Sundquist, supra note 22, at 937–38; Denman et al., supra note 20, at 517–18 & 
tbl.2; Schimel et al., supra note 20, at 78. 
 26 See Sundquist, supra note 22, at 934 (“Although we can quantify the earth’s ma-
jor [carbon] reservoirs and fluxes, balancing the anthropogenic [carbon dioxide] 
budget requires accounting for differences that are often small relative to the natural 
exchange and abundance of [carbon].”). 
 27 See generally OXFORD DICTIONARY OF BIOCHEMISTRY AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 98 
(Richard Cammack et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006); Denman et al., supra note 20, at 511–39. 
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and the natural build-up of carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and oxygen at 
the expense of more volatile components, such as methane and am-
monia.28  The eventual appearance of organic compounds, and ulti-
mately of life, is closely related to the creation of a chemical envi-
ronment in which the carbon cycle is manifest.29  That cycle consists 
of a dynamic equilibrium between carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, 
carbonate and bicarbonate ions dissolved in the world’s oceans and 
other waters, and carbonate minerals in the earth’s crust.30  The best 
known aspect of the carbon cycle is perhaps the uptake of atmos-
pheric carbon dioxide and water by plants and their conversion 
through the sunlight-induced chemical reaction known as photosyn-
thesis into carbohydrates and oxygen, which is released into the at-
mosphere.31  When the carbohydrates in plants are oxidized—either 
through consumption and digestion by herbivorous, respiring organ-
isms, by death and decomposition, or by incineration as fuel—carbon 
dioxide is released back into the atmosphere and the cycle is (in sim-
plified terms) complete.32  As discussed above, human industrial activ-
ity has resulted in a net increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide, and 
human land-use patterns, particularly deforestation, have had a simi-
lar effect, although the effects of land-use changes are uncertain and 
complicated by the interplay of tropical deforestation (which causes a 
net gain of atmospheric carbon dioxide), reforestation in the north-
ern hemisphere (which acts as a carbon dioxide sink), and the de-
 28 See generally Richard P. Wayne, Chemical Evolution of the Atmosphere, in  
HANDBOOK OF ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCE 3, 18–29 (C.N. Hewitt & Andrea Jackson eds., 
2003). 
 29 See id. 
 30 JOHN M. WALLACE & PETER V. HOBBS, ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTORY 
SURVEY 42–45 (2006).  As noted above, there are about 750 billion metric tons of at-
mospheric carbon in the form of carbon dioxide.  See supra note 20 and accompany-
ing text.  By contrast, oceanic carbon (as dissolved carbon dioxide in the form of 
carbonate and bicarbonate ions) is on the order of forty to fifty trillion tons.  Den-
man et al., supra note 20, at 514–15 & fig.7.3.  The carbon locked up in rocks and 
sediments (in the form of carbonate minerals) is on the order of sixty to seventy 
thousand trillion tons.  See 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 318 (15th ed. 1995). 
 31 See I.S. Sheoran & Randhir Singh, Carbon Dioxide Metabolism in Photosynthesis, in 
CONCEPTS IN PHOTOBIOLOGY: PHOTOSYNTHESIS AND PHOTOMORPHOGENESIS 430, 430–31 
(G.S. Singhal et al. eds., 1999). 
 32 See Sundquist, supra note 22, at 937–38.  Oxidation, and its complement, re-
duction, are chemical reactions whereby electrons—either directly or in the form of 
hydrogen or oxygen atoms—are transferred between compounds.  J. STENESH, 
BIOCHEMISTRY 523 (1998).  A simple oxidation reaction is the combustion of carbon 
to form carbon dioxide: C + O2?CO2.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, supra note 13, at 138, 335. 
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composition (oxidation) of organic debris and plant products (which 
releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere).33
But oxidation reactions among organic compounds comprise 
only one source of the global carbon dioxide budget.  The earth’s 
oceans constitute a significant pool of carbon dioxide.34  Carbon di-
oxide dissolved in the oceans’ surface waters are on the order of ap-
proximately one trillion metric tons of carbon.35  Whereas carbon di-
oxide dissolved in oceanic surface waters is thought in the long run to 
be in steady-state equilibrium with atmospheric carbon dioxide (i.e., 
there is exchange but no net transfer of carbon dioxide), variations 
in factors as diverse as vertical circulation of ocean water, changes in 
the production and dissolution of calcium carbonate (the mineral 
generally comprising coral reefs and the shells of marine organisms), 
and the rate of bicarbonate deposition into the oceans by terrestrial 
rivers can result in an imbalance and consequent “leaking” of carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere.36  The oceanic factors affecting the 
global carbon dioxide budget are not completely understood, and 
the system’s complexity tends to “prevent easy discrimination of the 
anthropogenic [carbon dioxide] signal from natural trends.”37  How-
ever, there is little doubt the oceans comprise an important compo-
nent of the global carbon cycle and consequently are a significant 
factor influencing the earth’s carbon dioxide budget.38
In addition, geological processes provide a long-term backdrop 
to climate change and the carbon cycle.  Rock metamorphism, vol-
canism, the chemical weathering of rock, and plate tectonics are all 
factors contributing to the earth’s carbon dioxide budget; indeed, in 
terms of geological time scales, atmospheric carbon dioxide levels are 
closely related to plate-tectonic processes, which are themselves a 
“major control on the long-term climate evolution of the earth.”39  
Rock metamorphism (transformation of rock composition and tex-
ture resulting from high pressures and/or temperatures) releases 
 33 Sundquist, supra note 22, at 938. 
 34 See COMM. ON THE SCI. OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE 
CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS 10 (2001) (discussing the at-
mospheric-terrestrial-oceanic interface of carbon dioxide cycle). 
 35 See Denman et al., supra note 20; Schimel et al., supra note 20; Sundquist, supra 
note 22, at 935 fig.1. 
 36 Sundquist, supra note 22, at 936–37. 
 37 Id. at 938.  See Schimel et al., supra note 20, at 79–80. 
 38 See Sundquist, supra note 22, at 940. 
 39 Eric J. Barron, Palaeoclimatology, in UNDERSTANDING THE EARTH, supra note 15, at 
485, 497–98; see also TECTONIC UPLIFT & CLIMATE CHANGE 8–10 (William F. Ruddiman 
ed., 1997) (discussing the interplay between tectonic processes and the biogeo-
chemical carbon cycle); WALLACE & HOBBS, supra note 30, at 44–45. 
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volatile compounds such as carbon dioxide and water into the envi-
ronment.40  Throughout the geologic past, volcanic activity, meta-
morphism, and diagenesis (formation of rock by burial and compres-
sion of sediments) at plate tectonic boundaries have resulted in the 
release of immeasurable quantities of carbon dioxide into the atmos-
phere.41  On the other hand, under present global geological condi-
tions, volcanoes, another important source of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide, discharge into the atmosphere about forty to fifty million 
tons of carbon (as carbon dioxide) per year.42  The carbon dioxide 
added to the environment by geological activity is thought to be in 
long-term, steady-state equilibrium with the carbon dioxide that is 
removed from the environment through chemical weathering proc-
esses.43  Nevertheless, perturbations in the global rate either of chemi-
cal weathering of rocks or of geotectonic carbon dioxide emissions 
could result in short-term net variations in atmospheric carbon diox-
ide levels.44  For example, the weathering of rocks is linked to global 
mountain distribution and to the amount of unsubmerged land mass 
exposed to weathering (as well as precipitation amounts), and volcan-
ism is a function of the rate of seafloor spreading at tectonic plate 
boundaries, all of which vary over geological time.45  In any event, 
geological and geotectonic processes constitute a crucial, albeit long-
term, complicating factor that underlies any discussion of climate 
change as it relates to atmospheric carbon dioxide levels.46
 40 Alan B. Thompson, Metamorphism and Fluids, in UNDERSTANDING THE EARTH, su-
pra note 15, at 222, 224; Peter J. Wyllie, Experimental Petrology, in UNDERSTANDING THE 
EARTH, supra note 15, at 67, 72. 
 41 See Simon Conway Morris, The Early Evolution of Life, in UNDERSTANDING THE 
EARTH, supra note 15, at 436, 456; Maurice E. Tucker, Limestones Through Time, in 
UNDERSTANDING THE EARTH, supra note 15, at 347, 358. 
 42 Sundquist, supra note 22, at 935. 
 43 Id.; Barron, supra note 39, at 498; see also WALLACE & HOBBS, supra note 30 (dis-
cussing rock weathering and terrestrial carbon dioxide cycle).  Chemical weathering 
and rock metamorphism comprise a chemical system in which minerals and carbon 
dioxide are exchanged with silica (the major component of the primary terrestrial 
minerals such as quartz) and calcium carbonate (the major component of deep-
ocean sediments and sedimentary rocks such as limestone).  See Barron, supra note 
39, at 498. 
 44 See Sundquist, supra note 22, at 935. 
 45 Barron, supra note 39, at 498. 
 46 No less significantly, carbon dioxide is not the sole contributor to global tem-
perature change.  Other factors include atmospheric water vapor, methane, chloro-
fluorocarbons, and nitrous oxide; fluctuations in solar luminosity; variations in to-
pography; and long-term astronomical cycles associated with the earth’s movement 
in space.  Barron, supra note 39, at 486, 497.  For example, methane, the main com-
ponent of natural gas and a by-product of certain manufacturing processes, is also 
naturally produced as “swamp gas” (for example, in rice paddies) and flatulence 
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III. CARBON DIOXIDE AND THE ABSOLUTE POLLUTION EXCLUSION 
A. The Regulation of Carbon Dioxide and Claims of Damages Based 
on the Environmental Effects of Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions 
Prior to the Kivalina action, litigation had commenced through-
out the country alleging corporate liability for the adverse environ-
mental and economic effects of climate change.  Courts dismissed 
those cases on justiciability grounds, and all currently are on appeal.47  
Moreover, whereas several states have attempted to regulate automo-
bile carbon dioxide emissions as they relate to adverse climatological 
(particularly, bovine flatulence), and is a “greenhouse gas” that is about twenty-four 
times more effective at trapping heat in the atmosphere than carbon dioxide.  See 
Donald J. Wuebbles & Katherine Hayhoe, Atmospheric Methane: Trends and Impacts, in 
NON-CO2 GREENHOUSE GASES: SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING, CONTROL AND IMPLEMENTA-
TION 1, 30 (J. van Ham et al. eds., 2000); Donald Goldsmith, Ice Cycles, NAT. HIST., 
Mar. 2007, at 14, 18.  As discussed earlier, atmospheric methane is a minor compo-
nent of the atmosphere, comprising less than two parts per million by volume, as 
compared to between 300 and 400 parts per million by volume for carbon dioxide.  
See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, supra note 20.  Thus, 
even though methane is a much more effective greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, 
carbon dioxide, because of its relative abundance, is thought to be the major con-
tributor to the intensification of the greenhouse effect.  See Sundquist, supra note 22, 
at 934. 
These additional influences on global temperature change—many of which are 
not well quantified, further distend the causal chain between any individual carbon 
dioxide source, a rise in global temperature, and the end effect of a particular in-
stance of resulting economic or environmental harm.  See generally Goldsmith, supra 
(discussing difficulty of discerning precise cause-and-effect relationship between cli-
mate and earth’s astronomical cycles known as “Milankovitch cycles”).  Indeed, calcu-
lating the precise effect of a particular climatological “forcing factor” is an exceed-
ingly difficult, if not impossible, task for scientists, let alone jurists.  Barron, supra 
note 39, at 486 (describing the gaining of “an understanding of the climatic response 
to a specific forcing factor” as “a major challenge”); Goldsmith, supra, at 18 (averring 
that “climate experts still can’t calculate the details of climatic ‘output’ from ‘inputs’ 
such as solar heating”); see also Barron, supra note 39, at 501 (speaking of “the diffi-
culty [of] describing [such] a complex, non-linear system”).  This complexity, and 
the causal uncertainty it engenders, should be kept in mind in any analysis of the 
purported effects of anthropogenically induced global temperature change.  See infra 
note 105. 
 47 See Comer v. Murphy Oil, USA, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-436 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) 
(dismissing on political question grounds and for lack of standing global warming 
nuisance lawsuit against petrochemical company defendants), appeal docketed, No. 07-
60756 (5th Cir. Sept. 28, 2007); California ex rel. Lockyer v. General Motors Corp., 
No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing global 
warming nuisance case against automobile companies based on political question 
doctrine), appeal docketed, No. 07-16908 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2007); Connecticut v. Am. 
Elec. Power, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing global warming 
nuisance case against power companies based on political question doctrine), appeal 
docketed, No. 05-5104 (2d Cir. Sept. 22, 2005). 
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effects, the EPA has recently declared that those states’ proposed 
emissions regulations are preempted by federal authority to set uni-
fied standards for greenhouse gas emissions.48  Several of those states 
have appealed the EPA’s decision,49 but in any event, as the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA makes clear, it is possible that 
the federal government will regulate carbon dioxide.50  Indeed, some 
states already have classified carbon dioxide as a “pollutant.”51
As a preliminary matter, it is clear that a regulatory or legislative 
classification should have no bearing on the analysis under a liability 
insurance contract because a regulatory definition of “pollutant” and 
the definition of that term in an insurance policy will not necessarily 
be similar in their terms.52  Additionally, and no less significantly, a 
regulatory or statutory definition of pollutant is parol evidence and 
would be admissible only where it might provide extrinsic evidence of 
the parties’ intent in the case of ambiguity in the policy’s own terms.53  
Since any future regulatory or statutory definitions of “pollutant” will 
inevitably post-date parties’ execution of existing liability policies, 
even given an ambiguity, any such definitions could not possibly aid 
in determining the parties’ intent in entering those contracts. 
Moreover, the respective analyses involved in interpreting an in-
surance policy and construing a regulation differ in kind, context, 
 48 John M. Broder & Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Says 17 States Can’t Set Emission 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at Al. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 (2007) (disagreeing with the 
EPA’s conclusion that it could not properly classify carbon dioxide as pollutant un-
der Clean Air Act). 
 51 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-O:1 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-87(a)(2) 
(West 2008). 
 52 Compare the definition of “pollutant” as any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal 
irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acid, alkalis, chemicals 
and waste.  Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed,” see 
text accompanying note 59, infra, with the definition of “pollutant” in the Clean Air 
Act: 
any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any 
physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material, 
special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter 
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.  Such term 
includes any precursors to the formation of any air pollutant, to the ex-
tent the Administrator has identified such precursor or precursors for 
the particular purpose for which the term ‘air pollutant’ is used. 
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000). 
 53 See, e.g., Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002); 
Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Westhaven Props. P’ship, No. 1-06-1895, 2007 WL 
3145359, at *9 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 26, 2007) (“In the absence of an ambiguity, the par-
ties’ intent is ascertained solely from the words of the contract itself . . . .”). 
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and motivation.  In interpreting an insurance contract, a court con-
ducts a “case-specific” analysis of “a contract between private parties” 
that “turns on such issues as the particular language of the policy, the 
insured’s reasonable expectations of coverage, and the rule that in-
surance policy exclusions must be construed strictly against the in-
surer.”54  Therefore, a regulatory definition of “pollutant” that is mo-
tivated by concerns of economy and public health can have little, if 
any, bearing on the analysis of an insurance policy in which the pri-
mary motivation is gleaning the intent of the parties when they en-
tered into a particular contract of insurance. 
B. The Absolute Pollution Exclusion and Its Applicability to 
Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
Thus, the question remains whether carbon dioxide is a “pollut-
ant” under a typical CGL policy.  To answer that question, one must 
consider the development of pollution exclusions. 
In the 1970s, insurance companies began to add provisions, ini-
tially by endorsement, and then as an exclusion in the policy form, to 
their CGL policies that excluded coverage for property damage and 
bodily injury resulting from the release or escape of pollutants.55  The 
1973 general liability form of the Insurance Services Office (ISO), 
commonly known as the “sudden and accidental” pollution exclu-
sion, excluded coverage for the escape or release of pollutants, unless 
the escape or release was “sudden and accidental”: 
This [insurance] does not apply . . . : 
. . . .  
(f)  to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the dis-
charge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, 
acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids, or gases, waste materials or 
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon the land, 
the atmosphere or any other water course or body of water, but 
 54 Adam M. Cole et al., PCLJ 37-1 Insurance Coverage for Global Warming Liability, 42 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 969, 975 (2007) (citing Haynes v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 
P.3d 381, 385 (Cal. 2004); Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 900 P.2d 619, 627 (Cal. 
1995); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ill. 1997); Northville Indus. 
Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (N.Y. 1997); Langone v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 731 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007)) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 55 Sharon M. Murphy, Note, The “Sudden and Accidental” Exception to the Pollution 
Exclusion Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The Gordian Knot of 
Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L. REV. 161, 167 (1992). 
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this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release 
or escape is sudden and accidental . . . .56
As the “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion came under 
judicial scrutiny, many courts interpreted the exclusion to provide 
coverage for pollution liabilities unless the discharge or release of 
pollutants was intended or expected by the insured.57  This was a 
broader interpretation of the exclusion than insurers would have 
liked; consequently, in the 1980s carriers began to issue what they 
hoped would be a more restrictive exclusion.58  The resulting “abso-
lute” pollution exclusion purported to eliminate coverage that had 
been allowed under the “sudden and accidental” exception to the 
ISO exclusion: 
This insurance does not apply to . . .  
(1) “Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out of the actual, 
alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of 
pollutants: 
     (a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy. 
 56 21 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 132.11[C] (2d 
ed. 2002); Int’l Risk Mgmt. Inst., Inc., 2007 COM. LIABILITY INS., p. IV.T.19 (1973 Cov-
erage Part Specimen).  There were variants of the 1973 ISO exclusion adopted and 
issued by other insurers.  Policies issued by Lloyd’s of London, for example, ex-
cluded coverage for: 
Personal Injury or Bodily Injury or loss of, damage to, or loss of use of 
property directly or indirectly caused by seepage, pollution or con-
tamination, provided always that this [clause] shall not apply to liability 
for Personal Injury or Bodily Injury or loss of or physical damage to or 
destruction of tangible property, or loss of use of such property dam-
aged or destroyed, where such seepage, pollution or contamination is 
caused by a sudden, unintended and unexpected happening during 
the period of this Insurance. 
Indep. Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 83-3347, 1988 WL 877629, 
at *81 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 1988).  The Travelers Insurance Companies also issued their 
own pollution exclusion, which precluded coverage in part for: 
bodily injury or property damage arising out of any emission, dis-
charge, seepage, release or escape of any liquid, solid, gaseous or 
thermal waste or pollutant . . . if such emission, discharge, seepage, re-
lease or escape is either expected or intended from the standpoint of 
any insured or any person or organization for whose acts or omissions 
any insured is liable . . . .  
Millipore Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 115 F.3d 21, 27 n.9 (1st Cir. 1997); see also 
Providence Journal Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 938 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (D.R.I. 
1996). 
 57 See Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 847–48 
(N.J. 1993); Murphy, supra note 55, at 172, 178–91.  See generally HOLMES, supra note 
56, § 132.6[A][1], at 87–89 & n.239. 
 58 See Burke, supra note 11, at 456–66; HOLMES, supra note 56, § 132.6[A][1], at 89. 
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     (b) At or from any site or location used by or for you or others 
for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of 
waste: 
     (c) Which are at any time transported, handled, stored, 
treated, disposed of, or processed as waste by or for you or any 
person or organization for whom you may be legally responsible; 
or 
     (d) At or from any site or location on which you or any con-
tractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your 
behalf are performing operations: 
          (i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the site or location 
in connection with such operations; or 
          (ii) if the operations are to test for, monitor, clean up, re-
move, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize the pollutants. 
(2) Any loss, cost, or expense arising out of any governmental di-
rection or request that you test for, monitor, clean up, remove, 
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants. 
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or 
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acid, alkalis, 
chemicals and waste.  Waste includes materials to be recycled, re-
conditioned or reclaimed.59
Under both pollution exclusions, coverage is excluded for prop-
erty damage or bodily injury only if it arises out of the release of a 
pollutant, which the absolute pollution exclusion defines as an “irri-
tant or contaminant.”  In contrast, the term “pollutant” is not defined 
in the 1973 ISO form, yet that provision excludes coverage for dam-
ages caused by the release of “irritants, contaminants or pollutants,”60 
which strongly suggests that the exclusion similarly applies to irritat-
ing or contaminating substances.  As will be discussed below, the 
definition of “pollutant” as an “irritant or contaminant” is dispositive 
of the absolute pollution exclusion’s inapplicability to anthropogenic 
carbon dioxide emissions. 
The majority of courts that have addressed the scope of a pollu-
tion exclusion have limited its reach to “traditional environmental 
pollution” and have declined to extend its effect to any instance of 
negligence that merely involved a toxic or hazardous substance.61  
The reasoning behind these decisions is exemplified by that of the 
Supreme Court of California, which held it to be “far more reason-
 59 Burke, supra note 11, at 466.  It is interesting to note that carbon dioxide emis-
sions from motor vehicles, which are at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA, do not fall 
within the parameters of this exclusionary language. 
 60 Id.   
 61 See MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1208–11 & n.2 (Cal. 2003) 
(considering absolute pollution exclusion). 
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able that a policyholder would understand [the exclusion] as being 
limited to irritants and contaminants commonly thought of as pollution 
and not as applying to every possible irritant or contaminant imagin-
able.”62  By the majority of courts’ logic, therefore, even substances 
that fall literally within the terms of a pollution exclusion’s definition 
of “pollutant” are not always considered pollutants subject to the ex-
clusion.63  As will be seen, anthropogenic atmospheric carbon dioxide 
does not even fall within the literal terms of the definition of “pollut-
ant” and is thus even further removed from the exclusion’s reach. 
One court has discussed in depth the applicability of a pollution 
exclusion to environmental carbon dioxide.  In Donaldson v. Urban 
Land Interests, Inc.,64 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that ex-
haled carbon dioxide was not a pollutant and thus was not excluded 
by a CGL policy’s absolute pollution exclusion.65  In Donaldson, in-
adequate building ventilation purportedly allowed the excessive ac-
cumulation of carbon dioxide exhaled by the occupants of the build-
ing, which allegedly caused certain adverse health effects—a 
phenomenon referred to as “sick building” syndrome.66  The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, 
 62 Id. at 1216 (internal citations omitted). 
 63 See Evanston Ins. Co. v. Atkins, No. 3:05-CV-2068-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
73746, at *21–23 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2006) (setting forth three-prong test to deter-
mine whether substance is to be excluded as “pollutant”: (1) whether claimed dam-
ages are caused by a substance that (2) qualifies as an irritant or contaminant, and 
adding that (3) even substances that fall literally within definition of “pollutant” will 
not always be excluded, if to do so would defy reasonable, common-sense expecta-
tions of the insured); see also W. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (Mass. 
1997) (holding that carbon monoxide given off by tandoori ovens in Indian restau-
rant was not “pollutant” under CGL policy’s pollution exclusion); Andersen v. High-
land House Co., 757 N.E.2d 329, 334 (Ohio 2001) (holding that carbon monoxide 
from residential space heater was not “pollution” so as to be excluded by pollution 
exclusion). 
 64 Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 728 (Wis. 1997). 
 65 Id. at 732. 
 66 Id. at 730.  The adverse health effects are not so much caused directly by car-
bon dioxide, but rather result from a paucity of oxygen or “fresh air” in a building.  
See Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 556 N.W.2d 100, 105 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1996) (Anderson, J., dissenting), rev’d, 564 N.W.2d 728 (Wis. 1997); supra note 15 
and accompanying text (discussing the non-toxic nature of carbon dioxide and ill 
health effects resulting from displacement of oxygen by carbon dioxide).  Interest-
ingly, and a point that the Donaldson courts did not remark upon, carbon dioxide was 
not the culprit in that case.  The injuries alleged to have resulted from the “sick” 
building at issue were caused by various undefined and unquantified contaminants 
that accumulated as a result of poor air circulation.  Donaldson, 556 N.W.2d at 101.  
According to the plaintiffs’ expert, increased concentrations of carbon dioxide 
merely acted as an indicator of poor ventilation, and the accumulation of other “ex-
cessive concentrations of air contaminants” was therefore likely.  Id. 
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which had “concluded that the policy definition of ‘pollutant’ unam-
biguously includes exhaled carbon dioxide because carbon dioxide is 
a gaseous substance which, at higher concentrations, can become an 
irritant.”67  The Donaldson court, while noting that the absolute pollu-
tion exclusion at issue “was intended by [the insurers] to have broad 
application,” nonetheless disagreed that it was meant to apply to 
“claims that have their genesis in activities as fundamental as human 
respiration.”68 The majority agreed with the dissenting judge below, 
that the terms “irritant” and “contaminant” must be bounded by 
common sense or else unintended and absurd consequences would 
ensue.69
Although Donaldson did not involve industrial atmospheric car-
bon dioxide, it raised some interesting and dispositive issues with re-
spect to the application of the pollution exclusion to global anthro-
pogenic carbon dioxide emissions.  First, in Donaldson, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court recognized the centrality of the definition of “pollut-
ant” as an “irritant or contaminant.”  Although it did not rest its deci-
sion on whether carbon dioxide fell within that definition, the court 
did join the determinative issue: at what concentrations, if any, is car-
bon dioxide to be considered either an “irritant” or a “contaminant”?  
Second, the Donaldson court noted the natural ubiquity of carbon di-
oxide, particularly that resulting from respiration, noting that “ex-
haled carbon dioxide is universally present and generally harmless in 
all but the most unusual instances.”70
With these ideas in mind, we now turn to the discussion of 
whether atmospheric, anthropogenic carbon dioxide can be consid-
ered an “irritant or contaminant” as defined in the absolute pollution 
exclusion, and thus, whether liability insurance coverage for a claim 
of damages alleged to result from an insured’s carbon dioxide emis-
sions is barred by the absolute pollution exclusion. 
 67 Donaldson, 564 N.W.2d at 732 (citing Donaldson, 556 N.W.2d at 103). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.; see Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 
1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992).  A Michigan appeals court reached an opposite conclu-
sion in an unpublished opinion affirming a grant of summary judgment to an insurer 
based on a policy’s pollution exclusion, which was held to preclude coverage for in-
juries resulting from the accumulation of sewer gas and carbon dioxide as a result of 
poor building ventilation.  Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.J. Taylor Corp., No. 203334, 
1998 WL 1992911 at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 8, 1998).  The court in that case, how-
ever, did not analyze the pollution exclusion or articulate the basis for its holding, 
other than to reject the insured’s arguments that the exclusion should not apply to 
completed operations or alternatively that it was rendered inapplicable by parol evi-
dence.  Id. 
 70 Donaldson, 564 N.W.2d at 732. 
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Some courts have held that a substance must be toxic in order to 
qualify as an irritant, contaminant, or pollutant.71  In a case involving 
insurance coverage for asbestos-related products liability claims, the 
Ohio Court of Common Pleas observed that “[p]lentiful authority ex-
ists in support of the proposition that the [pollution] exclusion is 
generally aimed at the release of toxic waste causing environmental 
damage.”72  In Beahm v. Pautsch,73 the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin 
addressed a form of absolute pollution exclusion that excluded cov-
erage for “the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke . . . or 
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into . . . the . . . atmos-
phere . . . .”74  The insured, by “burning-off” winter grass on his farm, 
contributed to a multi-vehicle accident when excessive smoke from 
the burning blew across a state highway, obscuring the vision of mo-
torists.75  The court found the pollution exclusion to be ambiguous, 
and interpreted it to “exclude[] coverage only where the injury or 
damage is caused by the toxic nature of the irritant, contaminant or 
pollutant . . . .”76  Because the properties of smoke for which the in-
sured sought coverage—its semi-opacity and ability to obscure vi-
sion—were unrelated to any toxic properties the smoke might have 
possessed, the court held that the pollution exclusion did not bar 
coverage.77
According to the reasoning in these cases, anthropogenic, at-
mospheric carbon dioxide does not qualify as a pollutant because 
atmospheric carbon dioxide is non-toxic and it is only harmful as an 
asphyxiant at concentrations far in excess of any conceivable atmos-
pheric concentrations.78  Therefore, following decisional law constru-
 71 E.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 144, 
152 (Ct. C.P. 1993); see also Haman, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 18 F. 
Supp. 2d 1306, 1308 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that the pesticide methyl parathion 
was “so toxic” that there was “no question” that it qualified as a pollutant). 
 72 Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 151. 
 73 510 N.W. 2d 702 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 
 74 Id. at 705.  The pollution exclusion in Beahm was in many respects similar to 
the 1973 ISO form, except that the former did not include a “sudden and accidental” 
provision.   
 75 Id. at 704. 
 76 Id. at 705, 706. 
 77 Id. at 706.  See also Guenther v. City of Onalaska, 588 N.W.2d 375, 376–80 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998), where the court held that a pollution exclusion defining “con-
tamination” to “include[] any unclean, unsafe, damaging, injurious or unhealthful 
condition . . . [that] arises out of any pollutant” was limited to toxic substances, and 
that sewer backup did not qualify as a pollutant unless damage resulted from the tox-
icity, rather than the sheer unpleasantness, of raw sewage. 
 78 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  Exposure to carbon dioxide concen-
trations in excess of 1.5 percent, which is roughly forty times greater than present 
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ing “irritant, contaminant or pollutant” to mean “toxic,” industrial 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide alleged to cause climate change does 
not qualify as a “pollutant” and damages purported to result from its 
emission would not be excluded from coverage.79
Courts that do not limit the absolute pollution exclusion to toxic 
substances per se nonetheless require that, to be excluded, the re-
leased substance qualify as an “irritant” or a “contaminant,” terms 
that are generally not defined in the policy.80  In common parlance, 
an “irritant” is something that causes a physiological or psychological 
response in an organism.81  At first blush, therefore, the term “irri-
tant” (like the word “toxic”) would not appear to apply to claims of 
property damage alleged to result from the effects of carbon-dioxide-
induced global warming.  And courts addressing the definition of “ir-
ritant” generally adhere to the biological connotation of the term.  
For example, one court distinguished an “irritant,” which causes 
“physical irritation, resulting in bodily injury,” and a “contaminant,” 
which “contaminate[s] the environment, causing property damage.”82  
Another court suggested that an “irritant” was something that evoked 
a physiological or mental response when it indicated that excessive 
light and noise could be considered “irritants,” but holding nonethe-
atmospheric concentrations, produces “no noticeable physical consequences” in 
healthy human adults.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 
13, at 391.  At concentrations above three percent, physical symptoms such as hear-
ing loss, impaired vision, confusion and difficulty breathing may manifest.  Id.  At 
seven percent (one-hundred and ninety times atmospheric concentrations), carbon 
dioxide acts as an asphyxiant, and exposure to this concentration will cause uncon-
sciousness and, if exposure is prolonged, death.  Id.  As discussed above, carbon diox-
ide comprises roughly 0.037 percent of the composition of the atmosphere.  See supra 
note 19 and accompanying text.  Thus, anthropogenic, industrial emissions of car-
bon dioxide into the atmosphere, even at recent peak rates, do not approach creat-
ing physiologically dangerous levels of carbon dioxide on a global scale.  See supra 
notes 23–26 and accompanying text. 
 79 See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1112, 1515 (4th ed. 2002) (de-
fining “toxin” as “poison” and “poison” as a substance causing illness or death when 
ingested or absorbed). 
 80 But see Guenther, 588 N.W.2d at 377 (interpreting policy containing definition 
of “contaminant”). 
 81 See I SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1428 (5th ed. 2002) (defining “irri-
tant” and “irritation” in biological terms); WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY, supra note 79, at 756 (defining “irritant” as something that causes “in-
flammation or irritation,” and defining “irritation” in terms of physiological or psy-
chological response to stimulation). 
 82 Sargent Constr. Co. v. State Auto Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1994); 
see also Danbury Ins. Co. v. Novella, 727 A.2d 279, 281-83 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) 
(adopting dictionary definition of “irritant” and concluding that there was no indica-
tion “that lead [from lead paint] ‘irritates’”); accord Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Stringfield, 685 
N.E.2d 980, 982 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
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less that they were not pollutants within the meaning of a pollution 
exclusion because light and noise were not “solid, liquid, gaseous or 
thermal irritants.”83  Because claims of environmental damage from 
global warming do not implicate the biological or psychological con-
notations of the word “irritant,” both in its common usage and as in-
terpreted by courts construing the pollution exclusion, whether car-
bon dioxide qualifies as a pollutant in these types of cases hinges on 
whether anthropogenic, atmospheric carbon dioxide is a “contami-
nant” as that term is used in CGL policies’ pollution exclusions. 
Turning again to common usage, “contaminant” is a significantly 
broader concept than “irritant,” encompassing anything that, 
through contact with or addition to something else, makes it “im-
pure.”84  That definition is too broad to be of any use at all.85  How-
ever, the verb “contaminate” is also defined as rendering something 
else “unfit for use by the introduction of unwholesome or undesir-
able elements.”86  Courts that have interpreted the word “contami-
nant” in the context of pollution exclusions have aligned themselves 
with this latter, more precise sense of the word, which essentially de-
fines a contaminant as a harmful substance that does not belong in 
the environment into which it is released, discharged, or emitted.87
Courts construing the word “contaminant” in pollution exclu-
sions have held it to include the bacterium Listeria monocytogenes in 
food products,88 oil and other petrochemicals in soil,89 liquefied cow 
manure leached into drinking water,90 and friable asbestos in a build-
 83 Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265, 268–69 (1st Cir. 
1990). 
 84 WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 79, at 314; I SHORTER 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 81, at 498. 
 85 Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1476 n.2 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (characterizing the majority’s broad construction of “air pollutant” in the Clean 
Air Act as including Frisbees). 
 86 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 491 (1993). 
 87 See Vance v. Sukup, 558 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996), vacated by 568 
N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1997) (table). 
 88 Landshire Fast Foods, Inc. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 676 N.W.2d 528, 532 
(Wis. 2004).  But see Keggi v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 13 P.3d 785, 789 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that “living, organic irritants or contaminants,” such 
as bacteria that contaminated drinking water, did not qualify as pollutants because 
bacteria “defy description under the policy as ‘solid,’ ‘liquid,’ ‘gaseous,’ or ‘thermal’ 
pollutants”).  The Landshire Fast Foods court expressly rejected this view.  Landshire 
Fast Foods, 676 N.W.2d at 532. 
 89 Breese v. Hadson Petroleum, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 648, 651 (M.D. La. 1996) (dis-
cussing diesel fuel); Harrison v. R.R. Morrison & Son, Inc., 862 So. 2d 1065, 1072 
(La. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing gasoline); Graham v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 632 A.2d 
939, 942 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (discussing residential heating oil). 
 90 Space v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 652 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (App. Div. 1997). 
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ing.91  In those cases, the infecting substance entered a medium in 
which it did not normally occur and thus rendered the medium into 
which it had been discharged or released “unfit” for use.  For exam-
ple, in the case of Listeria bacteria, its presence in food rendered the 
food “unfit for consumption.”92  Under dictionary and common un-
derstandings of “contamination,” the term “connotes a condition of 
impurity resulting from mixture or contact with a foreign substance,” 
thus rendering the infected material “impure.”93  In cases involving 
the seepage or discharge of petrochemicals into soil, the petroleum 
products render the affected soil impure and the property of which it 
is part “unfit for use by the introduction of an unwholesome or unde-
sirable element.”94  This reasoning was extended to a building con-
taining friable asbestos, where the court, considering a “contamina-
tion” exclusion, concluded that, as with infected soil, the affected 
building was made “unfit for use by the introduction of unwholesome 
or undesirable elements and/or [was made] physically impure or 
unclean.”95  With respect to natural fertilizer, such as liquefied cow 
manure, that substance might not qualify as a “‘pollutant’ or ‘con-
taminant’ when properly applied (and confined) to cropland.”96  
However, when the cow manure leaches into groundwater, and from 
there infiltrates a well (where it does not belong), it qualifies as a con-
taminant.97
Unlike harmful bacteria in food, petrochemicals in soil, friable 
asbestos in a building, and liquefied cow manure in drinking water, 
carbon dioxide is not a foreign substance in the atmosphere, nor 
does it render the atmosphere “impure” or “unfit for use” (whatever 
 91 Yale Univ. v. Cigna Ins. Co., 224 F. Supp. 2d 402, 422 (D. Conn. 2002).  The 
Yale case involved a contamination exclusion that precluded coverage for damage re-
lated to the discharge, release, and so forth of “contaminants or pollutants.”  Id. at 
421. 
 92 Landshire Fast Foods, 676 N.W.2d at 532. 
 93 Id. (quoting Richland Valley Prods., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Co., 548 N.W.2d 
127, 131 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
 94 Graham, 632 A.2d at 942 (“When oil escapes from a neighbor’s tank and in-
vades the property of another, it is a contaminant.  It has rendered the other’s prop-
erty unfit for use by the introduction of an unwholesome or undesirable element.”); 
see also Breese, 955 F. Supp. at 651 n.7 (adopting definition of “contaminate” as “to 
soil, stain, corrupt, or infect by contact . . . to render unfit for use by the introduction 
of unwholesome or undesirable elements”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Har-
rison, 862 So. 2d at 1072 n.4 (adopting the same definitions of “contaminant” and 
“contaminate”). 
 95 Yale Univ., 224 F. Supp. 2d at 421–22 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96 Space, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 358.  
 97 See id.  
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that might mean).  Whereas anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions 
appear in recent history to have caused a “geochemical perturbation” 
in the global carbon budget,98 it cannot be said that anthropogenic 
carbon dioxide is an impurity in the atmosphere.  In spite of recent, 
human-induced increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide, the recent 
perturbation is comparable in magnitude to past, non-anthropogenic 
variations in the global carbon dioxide budget.99  Such perturbations 
and their climatic effects are geohistorical facts.100  As discussed 
above, on geological time scales, global plate tectonics is the main 
driving force behind long-term climate change.101  Indeed, the geo-
logical evidence indicates that during the mid-Cretaceous Period 
(about one hundred million years ago) carbon dioxide levels might 
have been four to ten times greater than those of today.102
Seen in context, the present-day composition of the atmos-
phere—consisting of between 0.03 and 0.04 percent carbon diox-
ide—falls within a relatively stable norm.  It makes little sense, there-
fore, to describe atmospheric carbon dioxide from any source as an 
“impurity.”103  Carbon dioxide is an integral atmospheric component.  
Its concentration in the atmosphere has varied dramatically during 
Earth’s history, completely independent of human activity.  When 
correctly understood, anthropogenic atmospheric carbon dioxide is 
akin to generally innocuous substances such as sand and water, which 
courts have held do not constitute pollutants under CGL policies’ 
pollution exclusions.  For example, one court has held that the term 
“contaminant” did not encompass excess quantities of rainwater but 
instead described those substances that “defile the environment.”104  
 98 See Sundquist, supra note 22, at 935. 
 99 See id. at 939–40. 
 100 See id. at 935 (discussing an imbalance in the carbon dioxide budget at the end 
of the last ice age, between 10,000 and 20,000 years ago); Barron, supra note 39, at 
492–96 (discussing record of climate change over past 2.3 billion years). 
 101 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 102 Barron, supra note 39, at 498. 
 103 Consider also that the major source of anthropogenic carbon dioxide is the 
burning of fossil fuels, which is only an accelerated oxidation reaction.  The only dif-
ference pertinent to this discussion between burning fossil fuels (and releasing car-
bon dioxide into the atmosphere) and allowing natural processes, such as decompo-
sition of organic matter (and release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere), is the 
speed at which the process operates.  See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text; 
see also Sundquist, supra note 22, at 939–40. 
 104 State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gorsuch, 323 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (W.D. Va. 
2004). See also W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Iowa Iron Works, Inc., 503 N.W.2d 596, 600 
(Iowa 1993) (holding that “innocuous rubbish,” such as discarded sand, was not an 
“irritant” or “contaminant”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. M.L.T. Constr. Co., 849 
So. 2d 762, 770 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that absolute pollution exclusion did 
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Anthropogenic carbon dioxide, much like water, does not qualify as a 
contaminant under a CGL policy’s absolute pollution exclusion.105
IV. CONCLUSION 
Carbon dioxide emitted by an industrial producer alleged to 
cause property damage as a result of global temperature rise is not a 
“pollutant” as defined in the absolute pollution exclusions typically 
found in CGL policies.  Carbon dioxide is both a naturally occurring 
component of the atmosphere and an integral, indeed the essential, 
component of the earth’s carbon cycle.  Carbon dioxide therefore 
does not constitute an “irritant or contaminant” as those terms are 
used in CGL absolute pollution exclusions.  Moreover, carbon diox-
ide sources, both anthropogenic and natural, vary extensively in kind 
and in quantity, and anthropogenic sources account for a small frac-
tion of the global carbon dioxide budget.  In claims of property dam-
age alleged to be caused by anthropogenic-carbon-dioxide-induced 
climate change, insurers should thus not be able to successfully in-
voke their policies’ absolute pollution exclusions to bar coverage. 
not apply to rainwater, which “is not a substance that is usually viewed as a pollut-
ant”). 
 105 It should not be overlooked that pollution exclusions generally contain a cau-
sation element, and problems of causation closely attend to carbon dioxide’s role in 
global temperature change and its environmental and economic consequences.  See 
supra note 46 and accompanying text.  In an action in which an insured would claim 
coverage for damages allegedly caused by its carbon dioxide emissions, the plaintiff 
faces a daunting task, both as a practical matter and theoretically.  As discussed 
above, there are about 750 billion metric tons of carbon (as carbon dioxide) in the 
atmosphere.  Supra note 20 and accompanying text.  Since the 1980s, a combination 
of deforestation and human industrial pursuits has been contributing somewhere be-
tween seven and ten billion metric tons of carbon dioxide per year into the atmos-
phere.  See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.  Those pursuits include a vast 
array of individual activities, from cement production to agriculture to automobile 
operation.  The time element should also be considered.  Human carbon dioxide 
emissions are traceable to about 1750, and about half of anthropogenic carbon diox-
ide is attributable to the period before 1970.  See supra text accompanying note 24.  
Factoring in the effects of other anthropogenic greenhouse gases, non-greenhouse-
gas-related causes of climate change and the immense non-human sources of atmos-
pheric carbon dioxide compared to which anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions 
constitute a paltry quantity, as well as the complexities of the carbon cycle and its 
natural cycling of carbon dioxide through air, water, and rocks, the virtual and prac-
tical impossibility of showing that a particular claimant’s damages arise out of a par-
ticular defendant’s carbon dioxide emissions becomes manifest.  See supra note 46 
(discussing non-greenhouse-gas-related causes of climate change); supra Part I (dis-
cussing the immense non-human sources of atmospheric carbon dioxide).  Climate 
scientists themselves admit as much.  See supra notes 26 and 46, and accompanying 
text.  Jurists should be no less modest. 
